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ABSTRACT 
The US undertook the Kosovo campaign without an appropriate coordi-
nated military plan, for political reasons. The proper basis for Kosovo
intervention was a valid strategic concern. Europe needs the US to oper-
ate out-of-area: only the US has the aircraft carriers, the lift capacity, the
cruise missiles, the overhead reconnaissance capability, and other indis-
pensable components of an out-of-area campaign. These are sensible
criteria, which could help frame all debates about NATO intervention.
Blair’s address on April 22, 1999, offered a proposed doctrine for NATO
intervention in non-member countries. It had five parts, and might be
described as a NATO Powell Doctrine. “Are national interests involved?”
Here, Kosovo qualifies fully as to the underlying reality. The Balkans
remain a powder keg. The Vance-Owen Plan of cantonising Bosnia made
sense, and should not have been dismissed by Secretary Christopher. The
Russians have been essential to a solution. Wherever the Russian troops
had been in control, the Albanian refugees would not have gone back,
meaning a potentially unstable Macedonia. But with the NATO occupying
force in place, NATO could dictate the terms of Russian participation. 
The US undertook the Kosovo campaign without an appro-
priate coordinated military plan, for political reasons. Had we
deployed troops on the border at the outset, as we did in the Gulf,
this manifestation of resolve would have avoided some of the
genocide and ruin that took place after we started bombing.
Unfortunately, President Clinton felt too weak politically to mount
a ground campaign. 
All the US wars in this century, including the Spanish-American
war and this one, have been presented to the American people as
humanitarian endeavors, to forestall or roll back aggressors.
However, the US should in general hesitate before making war on
humanitarian grounds. Sometimes our intervention just flattens the
landscape, making things worse than the worst case had we not
intervened.
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Our duel with Milosevic seems to be an example of underrat-
ing your opponent. If the outcome of the game means everything
to one contestant and much less to another, the contestant most
concerned will think of expedients and desperate moves that the
one who is less involved will not have worked out in advance. We
did not anticipate that moving from diplomacy to force against
Milosevic to achieve a humanitarian purpose would result in the
same humanitarian catastrophe that we were trying to avoid.
The proper basis for our Kosovo intervention, which needs to
be understood, was a valid strategic concern: preventing the
flames of war from engulfing the whole area. That was a further
good reason to deploy troops early.
We can take some consolation from having whacked
Milosevic, however things come out. The next dictator on NATO’s
periphery will realize that he can’t just gobble up a neighboring
territory, put his hands in his lap, smile blandly, and hope that
everything will blow over. He and his advisors will realize that they
run a most serious risk of condign punishment.
A paradox of this war may be the revival of the distracting arid
expensive conception of the Western European Union, Europe’s
“independent defense pillar.” Everybody has now seen in action
why Europe needs the US to operate out-of-area: only the US has
the aircraft carriers, the lift capacity, the cruise missiles, the over-
head reconnaissance capability, and other indispensable compo-
nents of an out-of-area campaign. We are NATO’s out-of-area
specialists, since for us everything is out-of-area. A pretense to the
contrary is whimsy. On the other hand, controversy over the
bombing campaign may encourage the French, Germans and
others to favor the notion of the independent pillar. This will
involve sharply raising all the other members’ military expendi-
tures as a share of GNP (now only 60% of ours),1 switching from
a conscript to a professional military, duplicating part of NATO’s
expensive and highly practical command structure, and many
other painful expedients, including a good risk of losing any cam-
paign so undertaken.
One hopes several of the NATO countries—and the US—will
recognize from their experience in this war that a major power
cannot manage foreign politico-military policy by following
domestic polls. Fatal! Only a true leader, with broad strategic
understanding and forceful command skills, can manage a major
power’s foreign policy. In this affair, Britain appeared to great
advantage, thanks to Prime Minister Tony Blair’s principled and
stalwart stand.
Most of the press missed Blair’s address on April 22, offering
a proposed doctrine for NATO intervention in non-member coun-












































1. Are we sure of our case? On the one hand, even humani-
tarian intervention may do more damage than good; on the
other, some dictators only respond to force.
2. “Have we exhausted all diplomatic options?
3. Are there military operations we can sensibly and pru-
dently undertake? Some military operations for humanitari-
an purposes are not cost-efficient. Neither Somalia nor Haiti
can be called successes.
4. Are we prepared for the long term? Both the war and keep-
ing the peace thereafter can take more of a commitment than
we expect.
5. Are national interests involved? Here, Kosovo qualifies fully
as to the underlying reality. The Balkans remain a powder keg.
These are sensible criteria, which could help frame all debates
about NATO intervention.
No commentator I have encountered has explained the atti-
tude of Milosevic toward the Kosovars: he doesn’t consider them
real people, just riff-raff. He doesn’t necessarily want them dead,
he just wants them away, to clear the area for Serbian breathing
room. As we have seen in Bosnia, this attitude is not going to
change in any short period.
To that extent, the Vance-Owen Plan of cantonising Bosnia
made sense, and should not have been dismissed by Secretary
Christopher. Ethnic subdividing seems to be occurring sponta-
neously, and the pattern may surface again in Kosovo, as the
Serbs back away from the just rage of the neighbors they had sub-
jected to murder, arson, and rape.
The Russians have been essential to a solution. On Tuesday,
June 1, there was a dreadful marathon negotiating session in the
Hotel Petersberg, the German government guest house overlook-
ing the Rhine in Bonn, between Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, Talbot
and their military and civilian advisors. The delegations migrated
from room to room, squabbling. A key issue was that the Russians
demanded a distinct place for their troops on the ground in the
occupation, while Talbot refused. Wherever the Russian troops
had been in control, the Albanian refugees would not have gone
back, meaning a potentially unstable Macedonia.
The meeting stalled, and Ahtisaari called a break at 4:30
a.m.
At 8:30 a.m., the meeting resumed, and, astonishingly, an
agreement was quickly reached. Chernomyrdin yielded—the
occupation zone issue would be postponed. But with the NATO
occupying force in place, we could dictate the terms of Russian
participation. Clever...although the sly coup of suddenly occupy-
ing the airport was a deft counter.
Anyway, Yeltsin, probably informed of the impasse, doubtless
preferred to cave in and get the credit, rather than have the West
force it down his throat at the June l8, G-8 meeting. Yeltsin
remains our best hope in Russia, even with the sinister baggage of
Berezhovsky et al. 
NOTE
1 Britain and the US spend about $200,000 per soldier, versus about $70,000 for the
rest of NATO.
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